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The Public Trust Doctrine Adrift in Federal Waters: 
Fishery Management in the Exclusive Economic Zone 
off Alaska 
Joshua B. Fortenbery† 
The public trust doctrine’s concern for posterity necessitates an eco-
system-based approach to fisheries management to ensure that ma-
rine resources are left unimpaired for future generations. In Alaska, 
managing fisheries according to trust principles is a constitutional 
obligation, and in order to prevent the inconsistent management of 
migratory species, the same trust principles must be applied in the 
federal waters of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off Alaska, 
where fully half of the commercial fishing in the entire United States 
takes place. The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Act (MSA) currently governs fishing in the EEZ, and pro-
vides two means of incorporating the public trust doctrine into 
EEZ fishery management: (1) through the statute’s national 
standards, implemented by regional councils, which create 
trust duties requiring that fisheries remain viable year after 
year, and (2) through the delegation or deferral of manage-
ment authority to states with strong public trust doctrines. The 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has delegated or 
deferred management authority over several EEZ fisheries to 
the State of Alaska; those fisheries are currently being man-
aged according to Alaska state law, even though they are lo-
cated in federal waters. NMFS has indicated that objectives 
of the MSA are not inconsistent with Alaska’s state manage-
ment strategy—including its constitutional public trust obli-
gations. The public trust doctrine provides fishery managers 
with a means of expanding the scope of conservation strate-
gies within the framework of existing regulations, and allows 
                                                 
† Editor in Chief, Environmental Law, Lewis & Clark Law School; J.D. expected 2016. I would 
like to thank Professor Michael C. Blumm and my colleagues in the Public Trust Seminar course that 
inspired this article, as well as acknowledge the casebook that helped inform my understanding of the 
public trust doctrine: Michael C. Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, The Public Trust Doctrine in 
Environmental and Natural Resources Law (2013). I would also like to thank the student membership 
of the Seattle Journal of Environmental Law for their thoughtful comments and hard work. 
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environmental plaintiffs to challenge commercial fishing ac-
tivity that violates trust obligations by failing to protect the 
long-term health of both fisheries and marine ecosystems. All 
that is left is for the relevant actors in fisheries management 
to seize and apply the doctrine.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Although some resources in the United States are incontrovertibly 
impressed with inherent public access rights, the public trust doctrine that 
supports these usufructuary rights has uncertain contours.1 The public trust 
doctrine essentially maintains that certain natural resources constitute the 
corpus of a trust, which the state must manage for the benefit of both 
present and future generations.2 The doctrine traditionally focused on 
protecting public access to navigable waters for the purposes of fishing 
and commerce,3 but it has evolved into a flexible theory of resource 
                                                 
1. See, e.g., Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the 
People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 230-31 (1980) (explaining how “public 
rights in and over the beds of navigable waters and tidelands are firmly established,” but that beyond 
these areas the public has uncertain rights). 
2. DAVID C. SLADE, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST TO WORK 3 (1997). 
3. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and 
Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 431-32 (1989). 
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management, particularly over the last forty years.4 States have employed 
the public trust doctrine to assert public access rights to beaches,5 to 
impose use restrictions on water rights presumed to be vested,6 and to 
implement wildlife management regimes.7 There is no unified public trust 
doctrine, however; each state administers the public trust according to its 
own legal traditions.8 
 Alaska has a particularly robust public trust doctrine, which derives 
much of its authority from the “common use” clause of the Alaska 
Constitution.9 The Alaska Supreme Court has explained that the “common 
law principles incorporated in the common use clause impose upon the 
state a trust duty to manage the fish, wildlife, and water resources of the 
state for the benefit of all the people.”10 The framers of the Alaska 
Constitution were likely influenced by the U.S. Supreme Court,11 which 
had previously ruled that states exercise their power over wildlife “as a 
trust for the benefit of the people.”12 In Alaska, responsibility for 
managing natural resources according to trust principles includes an 
obligation for the state to treat fisheries as a public resource.13 
 Although the Alaskan public trust doctrine ostensibly guarantees the 
sustainable management of living resources within state waters, just three 
                                                 
4. See Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351 (1998) 
(attributing the expansion of the doctrine into other areas of natural resource management to an article 
written by Professor Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH L. REV. 471 (1970)). 
5. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1894) (“the public 
must be given access to and use of privately-owned dry sand areas as reasonably necessary”). 
6. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 452 (1983) (holding that no party 
can obtain a vested right to harm the public trust, and that trust principles must be considered in water 
allocation decisions). 
7. Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99, 102 (N.Y. 1917) (“In liberating these beaver the state was acting 
as a government. As a trustee for the people . . . it was doing what it thought best for the interests of 
the public at large”). 
8. SLADE, supra note 2, at 3. 
9. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (“Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and 
waters are reserved to the people for common use.”); See also Gregory F. Cook, The Public Trust 
Doctrine in Alaska, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 21 (1993) (“In Alaska, the scope of the resources 
covered by the umbrella of the public trust doctrine is far broader than in most other states”). 
10. Owsichek v. Alaska, 763 P.2d 488, 495 (Alaska 1988). 
11. Id. (“The framers of the common use clause probably relied heavily on Geer [161 U.S. 
519].”). 
12. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 530 (1896). 
13. See Gilbert v. State, Dep't of Fish & Game, Bd. of Fisheries, 803 P.2d 391, 398-99 (Alaska 
1990). (“The state has an obligation to manage fish and game resources to the benefit of all in accord 
with its public trust duties”); Metlakatla Indian Cmty., Annette Island Reserve v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901, 
915 (Alaska 1961) (subsequent history omitted) (“These migrating schools of fish, while in inland 
waters, are the property of the state, held in trust for the benefit of all the people of the state, and the 
obligation and authority to equitably and wisely regulate the harvest is that of the state”). 
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miles offshore, in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), it remains unclear 
whether there is any baseline protection of fishery resources.14 Because 
half of all commercial fishing in the United States takes place in the EEZ 
off Alaska,15 these federally managed fisheries have the potential to 
greatly affect the health of migratory species in Alaskan waters. The 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA) 
currently governs fishing in the EEZ,16 and delegates authority for 
managing the waters off the Alaskan coast to the North Pacific Fishery 
Management Council (NPFMC), one of eight regional fishery 
management councils.17 If there is no corollary to the public trust doctrine 
in the EEZ, the NPFMC presumably would be free to set fishery 
management policy without considering potential harm to future 
generations, thereby undermining Alaskan public trust principles and the 
state’s fiduciary obligations. 
 It is possible that the management of natural resources as trustee for 
the public is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, as one commentator 
argues.18 If that is true, then public trust principles would necessarily 
constrain any federal actions in the EEZ, as the U.S. is the only sovereign 
entity with jurisdiction over the fishery resources in those waters.19 This 
argument poses an interesting theoretical question, but overlooks two 
crucial ways in which the public trust doctrine is already relevant to fishery 
management in the EEZ. First, Congress incorporated public trust duties 
into the MSA’s national standards,20 and fishery management councils 
must consider these trust obligations in formulating all fishery 
                                                 
14. Mary Turnipseed et al., The Silver Anniversary of the United States' Exclusive Economic 
Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse, and the Possibility of A Blue Water Public Trust 
Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 8 (2009). Although the EEZ technically begins 12 miles offshore, under 
U.S. fisheries laws, the EEZ is defined as the waters between three and two hundred nautical miles 
from the coast., What is the EEZ?, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/eez.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2015). 
15. Molly Dischner, NOAA: Alaska Fish Worth $1.7B in 2012, ALASKA JOURNAL OF COMMERCE 
(May 8, 2014), http://www.alaskajournal.com/Alaska-Journal-of-Commerce/May-Issue-2-
2014/NOAA-Alaska-fish-worth-17B-in-2012/. 
16. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1883 
(2012). 
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(1)(G) (2012). 
18. See Casey Jarman, The Public Trust in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 65 OR. L. REV. 1, 2 
(1986) (arguing that the claim of sovereignty over the EEZ necessarily extended the public trust 
doctrine to federal resource management in those waters). 
19. Id. at 1–2. 
20. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (National Standard 1 requires fisheries to achieve optimum 
yield “on a continuing basis,” consistent with the public trust doctrine’s goal of preserving resources 
for future generations). 
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management plans.21 Second, fishery management councils can delegate 
or defer management authority to the states under certain conditions,22 and 
if a state has a strong public trust doctrine applicable to fishing, that state’s 
trust duties will be extended to any EEZ fisheries under its jurisdiction.23 
 For example, the NPFMC has deferred much of its authority to 
regulate salmon fishing in federal waters to the State of Alaska, and state 
regulations govern commercial salmon fishing in designated portions of 
the EEZ with no federal oversight.24 State management of these salmon 
fisheries raises interesting questions of federalism because Alaska state 
law—rather than the MSA—now applies in parts of the EEZ, even though 
the federal government has claimed exclusive sovereign authority over the 
entire EEZ. If there are no public trust duties impressed upon the portions 
of the EEZ managed by Alaska, this management scheme would create 
inconsistent obligations for the state, as it would have to consider trust 
principles within state waters, then abandon those considerations with 
respect to the exact same species of fish in federal waters. Such a result 
would be untenable, and contrary to the NPFMC’s stated goal of managing 
“salmon stocks seamlessly throughout their range.”25 Therefore, it is likely 
that Alaska manages salmon fishing in the EEZ according to its long-
standing role as trustee over the living resources under its jurisdiction. If 
Alaska is already applying trust principles in an EEZ fishery, arguably the 
objectives of the MSA are at least consistent with the public trust doctrine. 
However, the public trust doctrine requires protection of the entire marine 
ecosystem,26 while the MSA is mostly concerned with sustaining viable 
populations of commercially valuable species.27 The public trust doctrine 
thus encourages stricter fishery management than the MSA, ensuring that 
future generations will have unimpaired access not only to fisheries, but 
to all ocean resources potentially affected by fishing.  
                                                 
21. Id. at § 1851 (“Any fishery management plan prepared, and any regulation promulgated to 
implement any such plan, pursuant to this subchapter shall be consistent with the following national 
standards for fishery conservation and management”). 
22. Id. at § 1856 (describing state jurisdiction under the MSA). 
23. Id. § 1856(a)(3) (describing when state laws and regulations apply in the EEZ, extending 
applicable state public trust doctrines into federal waters). 
24. NPFMC, FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE SALMON FISHERIES IN THE EEZ OFF 
ALASKA 16 (2012) (“[S]tate regulations apply to all fishing vessels participating in these fisheries . . . 
”) [hereinafter Salmon FMP]. 
25. Id. at 12. 
26. See Ralph W. Johnson, Oil and the Public Trust Doctrine in Washington, 14 U. PUGET 
SOUND L. REV. 671, 678 n. 50 (1991) (“the right of fishery necessarily includes an implied right to 
water quality sufficient to support the fishery.”). 
27. See 16 U.S.C. 1801(b) (detailing the purposes of the MSA, which only discuss conservation 
in the context of commercial and recreational fisheries). 
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 As stated above,28 the MSA provides two means of incorporating the 
public trust doctrine into EEZ fishery management: (1) through national 
standards applicable to all management decisions,29 and (2) through the 
delegation of management authority to states with strong public trust 
doctrines.30 Accordingly, fishery management councils should be more 
willing to consider public trust principles in formulating fishery 
management plans, injecting long-term environmental considerations into 
fishery management decisions currently dominated by the immediate 
interests of the commercial fishing industry.31 Environmental plaintiffs 
should also be prepared to challenge fishery management decisions that 
violate the public trust doctrine, rather than relying exclusively on the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to bring suit.32 Although the MSA 
prescribes the standard of judicial review for challenges to regulations 
made under the Act,33 the MSA does not preempt the public trust doctrine, 
as several courts have found that the doctrine is not displaced by 
legislation, but rather supplements statutes governing resource use.34 The 
public trust doctrine thus provides fishery managers with a means of 
expanding the scope of conservation strategies within the framework of 
existing regulations and allows environmental plaintiffs to challenge 
                                                 
28. See supra notes 20–22. 
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1851. 
30. Id. at § 1856. 
31. See, e.g., Peter Van Tuyn, Courage Without Conviction: Cause for Chaos in U.S. Marine 
Fisheries Management, 28 VT. L. REV. 663, 666 (2004) (arguing that management measures without 
economic benefits are given little attention because “industry-dominated ‘regional fishery 
management councils’ are empowered to craft regulations for their own industry”). 
32. Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that a “reviewing court shall 
compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” and “hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be: (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right; (C) in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction; (D) without observance of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by substantial 
evidence;” or “(F) unwarranted by the facts.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). Under the MSA, a “court shall 
only set aside any such regulation or action on a ground specified in section 706(2)(A), (B), (C), or 
(D) of such Title.” 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(1)(B) (2012). Invoking the public trust doctrine would provide 
plaintiffs with a more flexible means of challenging agency action, as complaints would not be limited 
to whether agency interpretations of the MSA are reasonable and the agency would not be given so 
much deference. Turnipseed et al., supra note 14, at 58. 
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(1)(B). 
34. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Dep't of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (finding 
the National Park Service Organic Act to impose affirmative public trust duties beyond the plain 
language of the statute); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 445 (1988) (holding 
that the public trust doctrine must be considered in conjunction with the statutory appropriative water 
rights system); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000) (“The Code and its 
implementing agency, the Commission, do not override the public trust doctrine or render it 
superfluous.”).  
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commercial fishing activity that violates trust obligations by failing to 
protect the long-term health of both fisheries and marine ecosystems. 
 This article maintains that any assertion of sovereignty over 
migratory fish in the EEZ off Alaska is necessarily limited by the public 
trust doctrine, as unfettered management of those resources would 
undermine the Alaskan public trust doctrine and threaten depletion of the 
trust corpus. Part II explores the nature of Alaska’s public trust doctrine. 
Part III considers whether there is a common law federal public trust 
doctrine applicable to EEZ fisheries. Part IV analyzes the statutory 
management scheme of the MSA and the public trust principles that 
Congress imputed into the MSA’s national standards. Part V discusses the 
delegation of authority to states under the MSA, and asserts that the 
objectives of the MSA must be consistent with Alaska’s public trust 
doctrine because the state is applying its trust principles to the 
management of several fisheries in the EEZ off Alaska. The article 
concludes that the NPFMC and environmental plaintiffs should be willing 
to use the public trust doctrine as a means of encouraging fishery 
management practices that will benefit both present and future 
generations, as required by the public trust doctrine and the Alaska 
Constitution.  
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ALASKA PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
 Many scholars have already traced the international and domestic 
origins of the public trust doctrine, so this article will not attempt a 
redundant history lesson.35 The Alaskan public trust doctrine, although 
distinct from that of other states, contains many principles that were 
imported from other jurisdictions.36 Even so, Alaska’s public trust doctrine 
reflects a unique set of concerns. Alaska is a vast territory with an immense 
amount of valuable natural resources, and the state’s constitution contains 
several provisions aimed at protecting those resources, entrenching the 
Alaskan public trust doctrine as foundational law.37  
 Perhaps the most important public trust provision in the Alaska 
Constitution is the “common use clause,” providing that “wherever 
occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to 
                                                 
35. See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 3 (explaining the international origins of the public trust 
doctrine and its establishment in the U.S.); Sax, supra note 4, at 475–76 (describing the influence of 
Roman and English law on the public trust doctrine in the U.S.). 
36. See CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Alaska 1988) (adopting the 
“approach employed by [Alaska’s] sister states” in attaching trust obligations to state conveyances of 
tidelands).  
37. Cook, supra note 9, at 5.  
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the people for common use.”38 Although the common use clause does not 
explicitly mention the public trust doctrine, the Alaska Supreme Court has 
explained that this provision constitutionalized “common law principles 
imposing upon the state a public trust duty with regard to the management 
of fish, wildlife and waters.”39 In the context of managing living resources, 
this duty is both a “prohibition against any monopolistic grants or special 
privileges”40 and, with reference to fish, an obligation to “equitably and 
wisely” regulate harvests.41 Importantly, private citizens can invoke the 
Alaskan public trust doctrine to challenge state regulations, and the Alaska 
Supreme Court has stated that it will subject any regulations granting 
exclusive privileges over resources listed in the common use clause to 
close scrutiny.42  
 The Alaska Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Alaskan public 
trust doctrine reflect the doctrine’s emphasis on equal access to resources, 
and in fact, the state adopted the “common use” provisions of its 
constitution mostly as an anti-monopoly measure.43 However, 
guaranteeing equitable harvesting rights is not the only obligation of the 
state. The doctrine also requires state officials to prevent depletion of the 
trust corpus by providing for the conservation of fish and game 
resources.44 Obviously, guaranteeing equal access to a resource that the 
public could exploit into oblivion would be a meaningless exercise, and it 
is this additional duty to provide for the conservation of living resources 
that is most relevant in the fisheries context. The state’s obligation to 
conserve fishery resources is reinforced by the “no exclusive right of 
fishery” clause of the Alaska Constitution.45 Originally, this clause only 
                                                 
38. ALASKA CONST., art. VIII, § 3. 
39. Owsichek v. State, Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 493 (Alaska 1988).  
40. Id. at 496.  
41. Metlakatla Indian Cmty., Annette Island Reserve v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901, 915 (Alaska 1961) 
(subsequent history omitted).  
42. Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 494 (“grants of exclusive rights to harvest natural resources listed in 
the common use clause should be subjected to close scrutiny.”). 
43. Id. at 493 (“We begin by examining constitutional history to determine the framers' intent in 
enacting the common use clause . . . Its purpose was anti-monopoly. This purpose was achieved by 
constitutionalizing common law principles imposing upon the state a public trust duty with regard to 
the management of fish, wildlife and waters.”). 
44. Herscher v. State, Dep't of Commerce, 568 P.2d 996, 1005 (Alaska 1977) (“fish and game 
resources are permitted to be harvested, but at the same time must be conserved to avoid depletion and 
extinction”). 
45. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 15 (“No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be 
created or authorized in the natural waters of the State. This section does not restrict the power of the 
State to limit entry into any fishery for purposes of resource conservation, to prevent economic distress 
among fishermen and those dependent upon them for a livelihood and to promote the efficient 
development of aquaculture in the State”). 
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required the state to equitably allocate fishing privileges, but the 
constitution was later amended to clarify that the state can “limit entry into 
any fishery for purposes of resource conservation.”46 Essentially, the “no 
exclusive right of fishery” clause delineates the state’s fishery 
management objectives— although Alaska cannot grant any fishing vessel 
exclusive harvest rights, the state can restrict access to fisheries if 
necessary to ensure their continued vitality, consistent with its duties as 
trustee over fishery resources.47 Because trust principles are fundamental 
to Alaska’s fishery management decisions, state participation in the 
management of federal fisheries must involve the same considerations 
described above.48 The next section considers whether there is a common 
law federal public trust doctrine in the EEZ analogous to that of Alaska. 
III. A COMMON LAW FEDERAL PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE EEZ 
 President Ronald Reagan declared U.S. sovereignty over the world’s 
largest EEZ in a 1983 presidential proclamation,49 and arguments that this 
assertion of sovereignty created public trust duties in the EEZ followed 
shortly thereafter.50 One scholar argued that “the EEZ notion of sovereign 
rights brings with it . . . an increased role of public or common 
stewardship.”51 Despite many persuasive arguments regarding why the 
public trust doctrine should apply in the EEZ, commentators still have not 
reached any consensus as to whether the doctrine does apply to ocean 
resources.52 If a public trust already exists in the EEZ, a private plaintiff 
                                                 
46. Stephen M. White, "Equal Access" to Alaska's Fish and Wildlife, 11 ALASKA L. REV. 277, 
285 (1994) (ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 15). 
47. Id.; The Alaska Constitution’s “sustained yield” clause stresses that the state’s fisheries are 
to be sustainably managed, and describes fish as a “replenishable” resource. ALASKA CONST., art. 
VIII, § 4.  
48. Part V examines the implications of Alaska managing federal fisheries according to the 
state’s trust principles.  
49. Proclamation No. 5030, Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States of America, 48 Fed. 
Reg. 10605, codified at 3 C.F.R. § 5030 (Mar. 10, 1985).  
50. See Jarman, supra note 18, at 1–2 (arguing that trust principles should apply to the EEZ just 
three years after the declaration of sovereignty over those waters).  
51. Biliana Cicin-Sain & Robert W. Knecht, The Problem of Governance of U.S. Ocean 
Resources and the New Exclusive Economic Zone, 15 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 289, 307 (1985).    
52. See, e.g., Turnipseed et al., supra note 14, at 25 (recent article discussing the “unresolved 
possibility of a public trust doctrine for federal ocean waters”); Kevin J. Lynch, Application of the 
Public Trust Doctrine to Modern Fishery Management Regimes, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 285, 288 
(2007) (“it is not clear that the [public trust] doctrine would apply as a matter of law to many federally-
controlled marine fisheries”). It is possible that the continued ambiguity in the scholarship is due to a 
focus on whether public trust principles and the historical foundations of the public trust doctrine are 
theoretically consistent with sovereign management of ocean resources. See, e.g., DONALD C. BAUR 
ET AL., OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 58 (2008) (“Looking back to its origins, there are 
sound reasons for applying the Public Trust Doctrine in the federal EEZ”).  
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could invoke the public trust doctrine to challenge federal fishery 
management decisions that fail to protect the fishing rights of future 
generations.53 In addition, fishery management councils currently tend to 
focus on conserving species that have commercial value—when councils 
prioritize conservation at all—because industry representatives dominate 
the council system.54 A public trust doctrine generally applicable to the 
EEZ would require fishery managers to consider the effects of fishing on 
the marine ecosystem as a whole, authorizing environmental claims 
alleging damage to trust resources without necessarily tying those claims 
to the objectives of the MSA.  
 Regardless of whether EEZ fisheries are similar to other resources 
subject to the public trust doctrine, any claim that the federal government 
is burdened by trust responsibilities in the EEZ must find support in federal 
law to make that burden enforceable. This section considers evidence that 
the public trust doctrine applies to the federal government as a matter of 
common law. Part IV proceeds to argue that the MSA imposes statutory 
trust duties on fishery management in the EEZ. 
 There are at least two federal district court decisions that directly bear 
on the issue of federal public trust obligations. In U.S. v. 1.58 Acres of 
Land, the federal district court for the District of Massachusetts considered 
whether the federal condemnation of a state’s submerged lands destroyed 
the public trust impressed on that property.55 Adopting a theory of co-
trusteeship, the court held that the public trust at issue was administered 
jointly by the state and federal governments, such that “neither sovereign 
may alienate [the] land free and clear of the public trust.”56 One scholar 
has asserted that the federal government assumes this role of co-trustee 
any time there is a national interest in a resource under state jurisdiction, 
and that co-trustee obligations are an inherent attribute of the U.S. 
federalist system, with its “layered sovereign interests in natural 
                                                 
53. See Sierra Club v. Dep't of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (attributing a public 
trust doctrine to the administration of the national parks for the first time in the context of litigation).  
54. See, e.g., Van Tuyn, supra note 31, at 666 (“North Pacific fishery managers . . . have rejected 
habitat protections where the benefit of doing so cannot be expressed in direct economic terms; and 
they have done this despite the ever-increasing body of scientific information detailing the long-term 
destructive nature of trawling on marine habitats.”). If fishery managers considered their role to be 
that of a trustee over living resources, rather than mere facilitators of commercial fishing, perhaps with 
encouragement from environmental plaintiffs, it might be possible to shift the focus from the economic 
costs of habitat protection to the conservation benefits of habitat protection.  
55. U.S. v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1981). 
56. Id. at 124.  
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resources.”57 This argument is based on the property law concept of co-
tenancy, which posits that co-tenant fiduciary duties are created whenever 
two entities are equally entitled to common property.58 The concept of co-
tenancy has less certain application in the context of the EEZ, however, as 
even though coastal states and the federal government might have a 
common interest in migratory fish, only the federal government has 
claimed sovereign rights over EEZ fisheries.59 Thus, the resources in those 
fisheries are not obviously a common asset.   
 An alternative to co-trusteeship is the possibility that the federal 
government has an independent obligation to protect wildlife resources for 
the benefit of the U.S. public, separate from any co-tenant duty to protect 
a state’s trust property. After a transportation company allegedly destroyed 
thirty thousand waterfowl as a result of an oil spill, the federal district court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia stated that the federal government’s 
right to seek damages did not depend on ownership of the migratory 
birds.60 Instead, in In re Steuart Transp. Co., the court held that “[u]nder 
the public trust doctrine, the State of Virginia and the United States have 
the right and the duty to protect and preserve the public's interest in natural 
wildlife resources,” and therefore the public trust doctrine supported the 
U.S. claim for damages.61 This language seemingly provides strong 
support for the premise that the federal government has a trust duty to 
manage living resources for the benefit of the public.  
 Cutting against the strength of the Steuart holding, however, is dicta 
asserting that “no individual citizen could seek recovery for the 
waterfowl.”62 This statement may indicate that an environmental plaintiff 
would not be able to sue a third party for damaging federal trust property. 
Although the court stated that the U.S. has an obligation to “protect and 
preserve” natural resources, damage or threatened damage to those 
resources apparently only creates a right of action in the federal 
government against third parties.63 Such a construction of the public trust 
doctrine might not allow private citizens or state governments to hold the 
                                                 
57. Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the 
Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for A 
Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 85 (2009). 
58. Id. at 86. 
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) (2012) (The U.S. will exercise “sovereign rights for the purposes of 
exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing all fish, within the exclusive economic zone 
established by Presidential Proclamation 5030”). 
60. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 39 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
61. Id. at 40.  
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
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U.S. accountable as a trustee for any damage to the trust corpus. The 
Steuart court invoked the doctrine only to permit the U.S. to pursue 
damages; it did not indicate whether the “right and duty” to protect wildlife 
involved an affirmative obligation enforceable against the federal 
government.64 If not, the federal public trust doctrine would exist only to 
the extent that the U.S. government chooses to apply it in its prosecutorial 
discretion. Thus, even if this public trust duty applies to the fishery 
resources in the EEZ, it still might not serve as a check on unwise federal 
management because it would be unavailable to private plaintiffs. In all, 
the instances in which courts have recognized federal public trust duties 
lend uncertain support to the notion of a workable public trust doctrine for 
EEZ fisheries. Therefore, if there are any enforceable federal trust 
obligations in the EEZ, those obligations must have legislative origins. 
The next section examines whether Congress imputed public trust duties 
into the MSA.   
IV. FISHERY MANAGEMENT UNDER THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERY 
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT 
 Although the public trust doctrine’s origins largely lie in the common 
law,65 legislatures have also enacted laws reflecting trust principles,66 and 
many modern courts have recognized congressional intent to incorporate 
the public trust doctrine into various statutes.67 Thus, even though EEZ 
fisheries are already highly regulated under the MSA,68 the existence of a 
statutory management regime in the EEZ does not foreclose the 
application of the public trust doctrine in those federal waters, as courts 
have long recognized that the public trust doctrine complements, rather 
                                                 
64. See id. . 
65. See Turnipseed et al., supra note 14, at 47 (“The public trust doctrine has customarily been 
a matter of common law.”). 
66. See Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and 
Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 720 (2006) (asserting that the “National 
Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act, are based on public 
trust principles in the sense that they set out a policy of protecting and preserving the environment for 
its own sake and for future generations.”). 
67. See, e.g., Esplanade Properties, LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 986 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(stating that the public trust doctrine is reflected in Washington’s Shoreline Management Act); Sierra 
Club v. Dep't of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (finding the National Park Service 
Organic Act to impose trust duties on the Secretary of the Interior); See also Klass, supra note 66, at 
734 (“courts are relying on the common law doctrine but infusing it with policies and standards 
contained in more contemporary environmental legislation or state constitutional provisions”). 
68. See 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (2012) (asserting exclusive fishery management authority over the 
EEZ). 
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than supplants, statutes governing resource use.69 This section first 
discusses the structure and administration of the MSA, then examines the 
statute for evidence of affirmative public trust obligations.  
A. The Basic Structure of the MSA 
 Congress enacted the MSA to “conserve and manage the fishery 
resources found off the coasts of the United States . . . by exercising 
sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and 
managing all fish, within the exclusive economic zone.”70 The statute 
essentially divided the EEZ into discrete geographic regions and assigned 
management authority to eight regional fishery management councils.71 
Fishery management councils, largely comprised of state officials and 
industry representatives, must prepare a fishery management plan “for 
each fishery under its authority that requires conservation and 
management.”72 The councils have a considerable amount of discretion in 
formulating a fishery management plan (FMP), so long as it is consistent 
with the provisions of the MSA, including the ten “national standards.”73 
These standards reflect the basic policy objectives of the statute, such as 
achieving the “optimum yield” of each fishery on a continuing basis, 
avoiding discrimination between residents of different states, and 
considering the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities in 
order to provide for their sustained participation in a fishery.74 The FMPs 
developed by the regional councils, rather than the MSA itself, govern the 
specific management measures of each fishery, so in order to maintain 
federal oversight the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) reviews 
each FMP for consistency with federal law.75 The MSA thus creates a 
national program of conservation and management, while promoting 
region-specific management measures.76  
 Despite an equal emphasis on both fishing and conservation from the 
MSA’s enactment in 1976, overfishing has been a constant problem,77 and 
                                                 
69. See, e.g., In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000) (“The Code and 
its implementing agency, the Commission, do not override the public trust doctrine or render it 
superfluous.”); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 726-727 (1988) (rejecting the 
assertion that the California appropriative water rights system subsumed the public trust doctrine).  
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) (2012).  
71. Id. § 1852(a)(1).  
72. Id. § 1852(h)(1). 
73. Id. § 1851.  
74. Id.   
75. Eric Schwaab, The Magnuson Act Thirty-Five Years Later, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 
14, 15 (2012). 
76. Id. 
77. See Van Tuyn, supra note 31, at 663. 
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multiple amendments to the statute have addressed the failure to achieve 
sustainable fisheries.78 The most recent changes to the MSA, adopted in 
2007, required the regional management councils to set annual catch limits 
and included accountability measures designed to eliminate overfishing.79 
Although one National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) administrator described the amendments as “groundbreaking” 
and expressed optimism about the prospects for successfully ending 
overfishing,80 others are more skeptical.81 This skepticism seems to be 
based on an impression that the fragmented, regional, and regulatory 
nature of ocean governance is inherently unworkable and has prevented 
any meaningful progress in conserving ocean resources.82 
 Although a unified marine conservation strategy divorced from the 
MSA might be useful, the argument that conservation goals cannot 
otherwise be achieved ignores the benefits of fragmented management for 
certain EEZ fisheries. For example, fishery managers in New England 
refused to limit entry into the fisheries under their jurisdiction or set hard 
catch limits for years, decisions that arguably led to the collapse of the 
region’s fisheries.83 In contrast, fisheries in the North Pacific have 
remained relatively healthy, in part due to a fragmented management 
approach that allowed the Alaska region to set strict catch limits, while 
New England was encouraging unlimited participation.84 Had the New 
England fishery managers dominated national policy, in all likelihood 
every U.S. fishery would currently be on the brink of collapse, so it is 
important to remember that a unified management regime could be as 
harmful as it could be beneficial, depending on who is in charge. Further, 
as described below, fishery management councils can delegate 
management authority to the states under certain circumstances,85 and this 
delegation of authority can result in fishery management that emphasizes 
conservation and sustainability beyond the requirements of the MSA, 
                                                 
78. See Turnipseed et al., supra note 14, at 54-55. 
79. Shaun M. Gehan & Michele Hallowell, Battle to Determine the Meaning of the Magnuson-
Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006: A Survey of Recent 
Judicial Decisions, 18 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 7 (2012). 
80. Schwaab, supra note 75, at 17. 
81. Turnipseed et al., supra note 14, at 55 (“While this act provides a stronger mandate to manage 
fisheries sustainably than the previous Sustainable Fisheries Act, not enough time has passed to judge 
its effectiveness”). 
82. Id. at 7.  
83. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS AND OCEAN CONSERVANCY, THE LAW THAT’S SAVING 
AMERICAN FISHERIES: THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT 
10 (2013). 
84. Id. 
85. See infra Part V.A. 
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particularly when an authorized state like Alaska has public trust duties in 
fishery management decisions.86 
B. Statutory Evidence of a Public Trust in the EEZ 
 One scholar has argued that the MSA did not go far enough in 
incorporating public trust principles.87 By failing to impose a clear public 
trust burden on fisheries management, this commentator claimed that 
Congress “short-circuited the ability of courts to participate in ensuring 
U.S. fisheries management was sustainable.”88 While it is true that there is 
no explicit reference to the public trust doctrine in the MSA, it does not 
necessarily follow that the statute imposes no trust obligations. In fact, 
national standards 1, 4, and 8 all reflect public trust concerns. National 
standards 1 and 8 of the MSA both include an obligation to protect the 
usufructuary rights of future generations, an important public trust 
principle.89 Consistent with this purpose, courts have ruled that “the 
Service must give priority to conservation measures” when making 
management decisions under the MSA, 90 as the statute contemplates that 
commercial fishing will be a viable industry year after year.91 In addition, 
national standard 4 emphasizes non-discrimination in the allocation of 
fishing privileges, a reflection of the public trust doctrine’s historical 
emphasis on equal access to resources.92 Although neither the national 
standards nor the courts’ prioritization of conservation measures provide 
any explicit reference to the public trust doctrine, it is clear that the 
implementing agency does not have unfettered management discretion. 
                                                 
86. See infra Part V.B.  
87. Turnipseed et al., supra note 14, at 56. 
88. Id.  
89. See 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2012) (“Conservation and management measures shall prevent 
overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the United 
States fishing industry”) (emphasis added); 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a)(8) (2012) (“Conservation and 
management measures shall . . . take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing 
communities . . . in order to . . . provide for the sustained participation of such communities”).   
90. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that 
fishery quotas which did not have at least a 50% chance of meeting the MSA’s conservation goals 
were unreasonable).  
91. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2012).  
92. Id. § 1851(a)(4) (National standard 4 provides that “[c]onservation and management 
measures shall not discriminate between residents of different States. If it becomes necessary to 
allocate or assign fishing privileges among various United States fishermen, such allocation shall be 
(A) fair and equitable to all such fishermen; (B) reasonably calculated to promote conservation; and 
(C) carried out in such manner that no particular individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an 
excessive share of such privileges.”); See also Lynch, supra note 46, at 297 (“[National standard 4] is 
consistent with the decisions of state courts under the public trust doctrine that allow municipalities to 
charge reasonable fees for the use of their beaches, but do not allow them to “discriminate in any 
respect between their residents and nonresidents.”). 
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Instead, fishery managers are supposed to achieve optimum yield in each 
fishery “on a continuing basis,”93 rather than annually, and management 
measures must provide for the “sustained participation” of fishing 
communities.94  
 The MSA is not the only federal statute that contains public trust 
principles. For example, the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916 
contains language that suggests the imposition of trust duties.95 That Act 
provides that the National Park Service: 
 shall promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known as 
national parks, monuments, and reservations . . . by such means and 
measures as conform to the fundamental purpose of the said parks, 
monuments, and reservations, which purpose is to conserve the scen-
ery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and 
to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by 
such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future 
generations.96 
When the Sierra Club challenged National Park Service failures to 
mitigate the potential harm of logging activity adjacent to Redwood 
National Park, the federal district court for the Northern District of 
California held that the National Park Service Organic Act imposed public 
trust duties on the National Park Service, by requiring that park resources 
remain “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”97 
Essentially, the statute’s concern for posterity led the court to find “a 
general trust duty imposed upon the National Park Service . . . to conserve 
scenery and natural and historic objects and wildlife,” despite the absence 
of any specific statutory reference to the public trust doctrine.98 This 
statutory trust duty, reasoned the court, obligated the Secretary of the 
Interior to take reasonable steps to protect Redwood National Park from 
the effects of logging by upland property owners. 99 Although the threats 
to the park were largely external, and the actions necessary to ensure 
adequate protection of park resources required additional funding, the 
court ordered the Secretary of the Interior to exhaust all possibilities of 
negotiating favorable agreements with upland property owners, and to 
                                                 
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2012). 
94. Id. § 1851(a)(8).  
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).  
96. Id. 
97. Sierra Club v. Dep't of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (subsequent history 
omitted) [hereinafter Redwood National Park case].  
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 288.  
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request funds from Congress, if necessary.100 The recognition of the public 
trust doctrine was thus the recognition of an obligation beyond the plain 
language of a statute, as the court determined that the Secretary had an 
affirmative duty to protect the public trust and ensure that resources would 
be left “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”101 
 The Redwood National Park case indicates that a court can interpret 
congressional intent to impose trust principles even in the absence of 
specific statutory references to the public trust doctrine, because statutory 
management regimes complement the public trust doctrine rather than 
replace it.102 It follows that the trust language in the MSA— requiring 
resources to remain available for use by future generations, much like the 
National Park Service Organic Act— creates public trust duties in the 
management of the EEZ.103 There may not be an explicit reference to the 
public trust doctrine in the MSA, but there is an implicit endorsement, as 
the national standards clearly require fishery management councils to 
achieve optimum yield “on a continuing basis.”104 This statutory mandate 
indicates that a fishery cannot be exploited in a manner which would deny 
posterity access to the resource, just as the National Park Service must 
ensure that future generations have unimpaired access to the resources in 
Redwood National Park.   
 In addition to requiring the sustained viability of commercial 
fisheries, the MSA also includes provisions aimed at preserving the long-
term health of the ecosystems that support those fisheries. For example, 
the MSA’s definition of “conservation and management” stresses the need 
to avoid “irreversible or long-term adverse effects on fishery resources and 
                                                 
100. Id. at 294.  
101. Id. 
102. See Klass, supra note 66, at 728 (“as the modern common law public trust doctrine has 
developed . . . courts can now rely on that body of law to inform their interpretations of state 
constitutional law and statutory law.”). 
103. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1), (8) (2012).  
104. Id. § 1851(a)(1). See also N. Carolina Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Daley, 16 F. Supp. 2d 647, 
655 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“optimum yield is measured on a continuing basis, therefore ‘management 
measures must aim to achieve, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery, not the 
optimum yield in a single year.’”(quoting J.H. Miles & Co. v. Brown, 910 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Va. 
1995))). See also 50 C.F.R. § 602.11(d)(1) (1995) (optimum yield is based on maximum sustainable 
yield, which is defined as the “largest average annual catch or yield that can be taken over a significant 
period of time from each stock under prevailing ecological and environmental conditions.”). NMFS 
has stated that Alaska’s fishery management strategy, formulated according to the state’s public trust 
doctrine, is consistent with the MSA, implying that the MSA and the public trust doctrine are not 
inconsistent. Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Pacific Salmon, 77 Fed. Reg. 
75570 (Dec. 21, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 679) [hereinafter Pacific Salmon] (“as codified 
in the Alaska constitution, laws, regulation, and policies, [Alaska’s fishery management strategy] is 
consistent with the Magnuson-Stevens Act’s national standards.”).  
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the marine environment.”105 Relying on a similarly forward-looking 
statutory provision, the federal district court for Northern District of 
California imposed statutory trust duties on the Secretary of the Interior, 
even though doing so required the Secretary to seek additional funding 
from Congress and enter into negotiations with private parties.106 In 
contrast, if a court were to impose trust duties on a fishery management 
council, the council could fulfill those obligations by merely amending its 
own FMPs to provide better protection of fishery resources for future 
generations. Because this remedy would be far less burdensome than 
negotiating with private landowners or petitioning Congress for funding—
as required in the Redwood National Park case—courts should not be 
reluctant to enforce the MSA’s public trust obligations.   
 There are two important implications to the assertion that the MSA’s 
national standards create public trust duties. First, the trust duties imposed 
by the statute provide NMFS with a justification for rejecting NPFMC 
management measures that fail to protect the future health of the overall 
marine environment. FMPs are largely developed by the fishery 
management councils, and NMFS does not have the authority to institute 
whatever management policies it would like.107 But, the agency could 
encourage the NPFMC to reconsider the implications of the MSA’s 
national standards by requiring management strategies to involve forward-
looking public trust considerations. Further, although the NPFMC is 
largely comprised of industry representatives, and it is likely that the 
majority of council members may be uninterested in management 
decisions with no immediate economic benefits,108 the public trust doctrine 
provides any interested council member with a legitimate basis for raising 
concerns over the long-term sustainability of current management 
practices. Second, environmental plaintiffs or states concerned with 
federal management of the EEZ can challenge fishery management 
decisions by alleging a violation of the public trust doctrine if, for 
example, a stock is overfished and the future viability of a fishery is 
uncertain. Currently, fishery management decisions are challenged under 
the APA, and courts are inclined to defer to agency decisions so long as 
                                                 
105. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(5). See also PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 83, at 36 (arguing 
that the definition of “conservation and management” provides fishery managers with the authority to 
employ an ecosystem-based management approach).  
106. Sierra Club v. Dep't of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 294 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
107. Bonnie McCay et al., You Win Some, You Lose Some: The Costs and Benefits of Litigation 
in Fishery Management, 7 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 5, 24 (2001) (“NMFS cannot just do whatever they 
want to do. They have to work through third parties, the fishery management councils.”).  
108. See, e.g., Van Tuyn, supra note 31.   
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they are reasonable.109 Alternatively, if a plaintiff brought a claim alleging 
damage to the public trust—as did the Sierra Club in the Redwood 
National Park case—a court would not have to accord agency actions the 
same degree of deference.110 As Professor Lum has stated, this is “because 
breach of trust claims do not require the courts to defer to agency 
decisions, as would be the norm in an administrative procedure act 
appeal,” so courts are “less constrained to adopt the agency’s point of 
view.”111 By curtailing deference to NMFS, the public trust doctrine might 
provide a new, independent means of challenging fishing activity that 
negatively impacts the future health of marine ecosystems—a more 
efficient alternative to current challenges being made on a species by 
species basis and only in response to federal agency actions.  
V. THE ALASKAN PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE EEZ 
 The MSA allows fishery management councils to delegate 
management authority to the states in certain situations, as discussed 
further below.112 When a council chooses to delegate authority to a state 
that manages fisheries subject to the public trust doctrine, as in the case of 
Alaska, the doctrine necessarily applies to EEZ fishery management, 
regardless of whether there is a federal public trust. This section examines 
the authority of fishery management councils to delegate or defer fishery 
management to a state, and then considers three EEZ fisheries in which 
the NPFMC has delegated or deferred management authority to the State 
of Alaska: Tanner crab, rockfish, and salmon. In each of these fisheries, 
the State of Alaska has considerable discretion in its management 
decisions, so long as it does not take actions inconsistent with federal 
regulations.113 Often, the areas under state management are subject to 
stricter regulation than those under federal control, 114 a fact at least 
                                                 
109. Turnipseed et al., supra note 14, at 57. See also McCay et al., supra note 107, at 24 
(“Magnuson-Stevens Act is set up in a way that is very difficult to attack. The amount of discretion 
that is vested in the agency is enormous.”). 
110. Arnold L. Lum, How Goes the Public Trust Doctrine: Is the Common Law Shaping 
Environmental Policy?, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 73, 74-75 (2003).  
111. Id. at 75.  
112. See infra Part V.A.  
113. NPFMC, FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR BERING SEA/ALEUTIAN ISLANDS KING AND 
TANNER CRABS 7 (2011) [hereinafter Crab FMP], available at http://www.npfmc.org/wp-
content/PDFdocuments/fmp/CrabFMPOct11.pdf. The fisheries in the EEZ off Alaska are also subject 
to international treaty agreements in some instances. See Salmon FMP, supra note 24, at ii. Whether 
Alaska’s public trust doctrine applies in a fishery subject to a treaty is an open question beyond the 
scope of this article.  
114. NPFMC, FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR GROUNDFISH OF THE GULF OF ALASKA 55 
(2013) [hereinafter Rockfish FMP], available at http://www.npfmc.org/wp-content/PDFdocuments 
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partially attributable to Alaska’s public trust doctrine, which requires a 
greater focus on the long-term health of fisheries than does the MSA.115 
NMFS has already indicated that Alaska’s management strategy is 
consistent with the MSA, including the state’s constitutional obligation to 
act as trustee over fishery resources,116 so nothing in the MSA restricts the 
NPFMC from adopting the same trust principles as the State of Alaska. 
The NPFMC should therefore incorporate trust principles into the 
management of other fisheries under its jurisdiction to maintain a 
consistent management approach throughout the region.117 
A. The Delegation of Fishery Management Authority to States  
 Although the MSA states that the U.S. has “exclusive fishery 
management authority over all fish . . . within the [EEZ],”118 the statute 
also describes two situations in which a state can regulate fishing vessels 
in the EEZ: (1) if the fishing vessel is registered under the law of that state, 
and there is either no FMP in place for the relevant fishery or the state’s 
regulations are consistent with the FMP; or (2) if the FMP for the fishery 
in which a vessel is operating delegates management authority to a state.119 
NMFS contends that these two provisions allow fishery management 
councils to either defer or delegate management authority to a state when 
a council deems such action appropriate.120 In a recent challenge to that 
interpretation of the MSA, the United Cook Inlet Drift Association 
                                                 
/fmp/GOA/GOAfmp613.pdf (“Such State regulations are in addition to and stricter than Federal 
regulations”).  
115. Compare ALASKA CONST. art. VIII § 4 (“Fish, forests, wildlife, grasslands, and all other 
replenishable resources belonging to the State shall be utilized, developed, and maintained on the 
sustained yield principle) with 16 U.S.C. 1851(a)(1) (“Conservation and management measures shall 
prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery”). 
The state focus on sustained yield principles, as opposed to a mandate that fisheries achieve optimum 
yield each year, provides a more flexible means of effectuating in-season closures and considering 
long-term effects of fishing. See Native Vill. of Elim v. State, 990 P.2d 1, 8 (Alaska 1999) (In applying 
the “sustained yield” clause, the Alaska Board of Fisheries “adopted a number of concrete measures 
designed to sustain the salmon runs when evidence indicated that they were in decline: closing and/or 
severely restricting the commercial, sport, and subsistence fisheries; modifying the fishing season; and 
imposing chum caps, a permit system, and restrictive gear requirements.”).  
116. Pacific Salmon, supra note 104, at 75575 (“current management, as codified in the Alaska 
constitution, laws, regulations, and policies, is consistent with the Magnuson-Stevens Act’s national 
standards.”).  
117. This may even be mandated by national standard 3, which provides that “[t]o the extent 
practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed as a unit throughout its range, and interrelated 
stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination.” 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(3) (2012).  
118. Id. § 1811(a).  
119. Id. § 1856(a)(3)(A)–(B).  
120. United Cook Inlet Drift Ass’n v. National Marine Fisheries Service (UCIDA), 3:13-cv-
00104-TMB, 17 (D. Alaska 2014) (on file with author). 
2015] The Public Trust Doctrine Adrift in Federal Waters 247 
 
(UCIDA), a group of commercial fishermen, claimed that NMFS 
improperly removed three salmon fisheries from the applicable FMP, 
thereby deferring management to the State of Alaska.121 The federal 
district court for the District of Alaska upheld the NMFS decision as a 
reasonable interpretation of the MSA, noting that the statute clearly 
contemplated state regulation in the absence of a federal management 
plan.122 
 The UCIDA court, the first to consider state management in the EEZ, 
indicated that not every fishery requires federal management throughout 
the EEZ. The court stated that the MSA “sought to ensure that states 
maintained an active role in fisheries management.”123 Delegating or 
deferring management authority to the states for a migratory species can, 
according to the court, give effect to national standard 3, which requires 
stocks to be managed as a unit throughout their range to the extent 
practicable.124 Because the authority of the fishery management councils 
to defer management to the states by revoking an FMP (as opposed to 
specifically delegating authority in an FMP) is ambiguous, NMFS’s 
interpretation of the MSA on this issue was, according to the court, entitled 
to deference.125 The implications of NMFS’s ability to defer or delegate 
management authority to the State of Alaska are explored below.126 
However, it is clear that even if there is no federal public trust doctrine in 
the EEZ—which is far from certain—127 when the fragmented nature of 
the MSA creates state-regulated pockets in the EEZ, managing states will 
apply their public trust principles to the EEZ. The regionalized fishery 
management system can therefore produce conservation benefits under the 
right circumstances as, where it applies, the public trust doctrine requires 
state fishery managers to consider the long-term impacts of fishery 
management decisions on entire marine ecosystems, rather than focusing 
on a single target species in each management plan.128  
                                                 
121. Id. at 7.  
122. Id. at 20.  
123. Id. at 19.  
124. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(3) (2012). 
125. UCIDA v. NMFS, at 28. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843 (1984) (“if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question 
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute”). 
126. See infra Part V.B.  
127. See supra Part IV (discussing the trust duties Congress imposed through the MSA’s national 
standards). 
128. See, e.g., Kathryn J. Mengerink, The Pew Oceans Commission Report: Navigating A Route 
to Sustainable Seas, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 689, 699 (2004) (explaining “fishery management plans are 
criticized because they manage single species rather than ecosystems. Problems attributed to single-
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B. EEZ Fisheries Managed by Alaska 
 Alaska currently has management authority over several EEZ 
fisheries, and thus the state’s public trust doctrine is already relevant to 
fishery management in portions of the EEZ. In 1987, NMFS repealed the 
FMP for the Tanner crab fishery in the Gulf of Alaska because the FMP 
failed to coordinate federal management efforts with the State of 
Alaska.129 NMFS determined that the FMP had not provided adequate 
flexibility in managing the crab fishery, as the plan did not allow the 
federal government to make in-season adjustments—such as adopting 
state harvest guidelines or recommended closures—that were at times 
necessary to ensure the conservation and protection of the stock.130 There 
is currently no FMP for the Tanner crab fishery in the Gulf of Alaska, so 
management is deferred to the State of Alaska with no federal 
involvement.131 Alaska’s constitutional public trust obligations therefore 
play a huge role in ensuring the continued stability of one of the most 
commercially important fisheries in the region. Further, when NMFS 
developed a new FMP for crab in the Bering Sea, approved in 1989, it 
sought to avoid the inflexibility of the previous FMP by delegating certain 
management measures to the State of Alaska, though, in this case, subject 
to federal oversight.132 The primary objective of the current Bering Sea 
Tanner crab FMP is to “[e]nsure the long-term reproductive viability of 
king and Tanner crab populations.”133 This goal is consistent with Alaska’s 
public trust doctrine because it emphasizes the importance of maintaining 
the health of the fishery for future generations. When the crab FMP is 
considered in context—as part of a plan delegating management authority 
to a state with strong public trust traditions—it likely represents the first 
instance of a federal action creating public trust obligations in the EEZ, 
                                                 
species management include lack of consideration of significant ecosystem effects of commercial 
fishing such as habitat destruction and bycatch.”).  
129. Tanner Crab off Alaska, 52 Fed. Reg. 17577, 17578 (May 11, 1987) (to be codified at 50 
C.F.R. pt. 671); 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(3) (2012) (the FMP’s failure to coordinate management with the 
state was a violation of national standard 3, which requires stocks to be managed as a unit throughout 
their range to the extent practicable). 
130. Id. 
131. See, Species, Tanner Crab Management, ALASKA DEP’T OF FISH AND GAME, 
http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfm?adfg=tannercrab.management (last visited Spring 2015) (“The 
Alaska State Constitution establishes, as state policy, the development and use of replenishable 
resources, in accordance with the principle of sustained yield, for the maximum benefit of the people 
of the state.”). 
132. Crab FMP, supra note 113, at 7. 
133. Id. at 1.  
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because Alaska is still bound by its constitutionally-mandated public trust 
duties even when acting with delegated authority from NMFS.134 
 In an action similar to the repeal of the crab FMP, in 1998, NMFS 
removed black and blue rockfish from the FMP for groundfish in the Gulf 
of Alaska.135 The purpose of this action was to prevent localized 
overfishing by allowing the state to implement harvest guidelines based 
on smaller geographic areas— a measure that was not possible under 
federal regulations.136 Federal management had relied on sampling data 
from a pelagic trawl fishery and set high overall catch limits for rockfish, 
creating essentially unrestricted harvests of nearshore rockfish.137 By 
allowing the state to set catch limits based on its own sampling data, 
NMFS’s final rule noted that removing the two species of rockfish from 
the FMP “should result in more effective conservation measures in both 
nearshore and offshore areas.”138 In addition, an environmental assessment 
concluded that, even though the fisheries might undergo short-term 
restrictions, the “[l]ong term economic effects . . . should be beneficial as 
stocks of black rockfish would be sustained under more direct 
management.”139 All of these findings are consistent with the notion that 
state management, pursuant to Alaska’s public trust doctrine, will 
necessarily involve planning for the long-term conservation of a species 
to ensure continued public access to the fishery.  
 NMFS has also delegated Alaska the authority to regulate state-
registered vessels fishing in the eastern section of the demersal shelf 
rockfish fishery,140 allowing for increased coordination between state and 
federal management of the species. 141 NMFS’s coordination with Alaska 
                                                 
134. Id. at 2 (under the FMP, minimum sizes, catch limits, in-season adjustments, and closed 
waters are all adopted under state laws, subject to an appeals process in the FMP, so Alaska will 
promulgate many important regulations pursuant to state law and these management decisions will all 
be burdened by the state public trust doctrine); see also Tanner Crab off Alaska, supra note 129 
(NMFS has recognized that the state’s management policies provide the flexibility to effectuate in-
season fishery closures due to the state’s emphasis on maintaining fishery productivity for future 
generations, consistent with Alaska’s public trust duties). 
135. Management Authority for Black and Blue Rockfish, 63 Fed. Reg. 11167 (March 6, 1998) 
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 679).  
136. Id. 
137. NPFMC, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF AMENDMENT 46 TO THE FISHERY 
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR GROUNDFISH OF THE GULF OF ALASKA 2 (Jan. 1998), available at 
http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/analyses/groundfish/EA_Amendment_46_GOA_Jan_1997.pdf.  
138. Management Authority for Black and Blue Rockfish, supra note 135, at 11168. 
139. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF AMENDMENT 46, supra note 130, at 20. 
140. Rockfish FMP, supra note 114, at 55. 
141. Id. at 57 (“the Regional Administrator must coordinate inseason adjustments, when 
appropriate, with the State of Alaska to assure uniformity of management in both State and Federal 
waters.”). 
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will necessarily involve public trust considerations, as trust principles are 
inherent to any state management strategy. That is, because the Alaskan 
public trust doctrine finds authority in the Alaska Constitution and clearly 
applies to the management of fishery resources,142 regardless of whether 
such management is in coordination with the federal government, state 
fishery managers must provide for the sustained yield of fisheries and 
consider the effects of fishing on future generations.143 
 Most recently, NMFS amended the FMP for salmon fisheries in the 
EEZ off Alaska to remove three historical net fisheries from the western 
area of the Gulf of Alaska, thereby entirely deferring management of those 
fisheries to the state.144 The amendment also reaffirmed Alaska’s 
management authority over the entire eastern area of the Gulf.145 This 
amendment led to the litigation discussed above, in which the United Cook 
Inlet Drift Association unsuccessfully challenged NMFS’s authority to 
defer management to the State of Alaska.146 Under the current FMP, all 
commercial salmon fishing in the western Gulf of Alaska is now managed 
by the State of Alaska, with the federal government retaining management 
authority only over areas closed to commercial fishing.147 NMFS 
determined that the State of Alaska’s escapement-based system of salmon 
management— which monitors the estimated size of spawning stock in 
key rivers, streams, or watersheds, and allows for in-season adjustments 
to harvest limits— was superior to the MSA’s rigid annual catch limits.148 
Escapement-based management is more effective at preventing 
overfishing of salmon than the pre-season predictions of sustainable catch 
limits used in most FMPs, because the state management program is 
conducted in real time and provides fishery managers with in-season 
                                                 
142. ALASKA CONST., art VIII § 3 (“Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and 
waters are reserved to the people for their common use.”); Gilbert v. State, Dep’t of Fish & Game, Bd. 
of Fisheries, 803 P.2d 391, 398-99 (Alaska 1990) (“The state has an obligation to manage fish and 
game resources to the benefit of all in accord with its public trust duties.”). 
143. ALASKA CONST., art VIII § 4 (“Fish . . . and all other replenishable resources belonging to 
the state shall be utilized, developed, and maintained on the sustained yield principle.”) (emphasis 
added). 
144. Pacific Salmon, supra note 104.  
145. Id. 
146. United Cook Inlet Drift Ass’n v. National Marine Fisheries Service, No. 3:13-cv-00104-
TMB (D. Alaska filed Sept. 5, 2014). 
147. See Salmon FMP, supra note 24, at 9 (the rest of the west area was closed to net fishing by 
the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, so presumably 
federal authority to regulate salmon fishing in this part of the EEZ would only be relevant in the event 
that the international convention is amended or repealed). 
148. NMFS, AMENDMENT 12: REVISIONS TO THE FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE 
SALMON FISHERIES IN THE EEZ OFF THE COAST OF ALASKA 55 (2012), available at 
http://www.alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/amds/default.htm. 
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assessments of run strength.149 If salmon runs are lower than expected, 
fishery managers can make in-season closures and ensure that minimum 
escapement goals are met in order to “maximize surplus productivity of 
future runs.”150 As expected, the state management strategy is willing to 
sacrifice short-term economic benefits to provide for the sustained vitality 
of the fishery—a management philosophy consistent with the public trust 
doctrine’s emphasis on preserving resources so that they might be enjoyed 
by future generations. This public trust objective, grounded in state law,151 
allows state fishery managers to think beyond the current fishing season, 
and stands in contrast to the goals of the NPFMC, which is dominated by 
industry representatives and is thus generally concerned with immediate 
economic benefits.152 
 Further, NMFS made a determination that the state’s management 
strategy “as codified in the Alaska constitution, laws, regulation, and 
policies, is consistent with the Magnuson-Stevens Act’s national 
standards.”153 This statement is arguably the first time NMFS has 
acknowledged that Alaska’s laws, including its constitutional provisions 
concerning the state’s public trust doctrine, are consistent with federal 
fishery management laws. Such an assertion indicates that the NPFMC 
should consider trust principles even in federally managed EEZ fisheries, 
as the MSA is not inconsistent with the Alaskan public trust doctrine. The 
NPFMC should be especially willing to consider trust principles when it 
is necessary to coordinate management efforts with the State of Alaska 
regarding migratory species, as such considerations would encourage 
management strategies that focus less on a single fishing season and more 
on the need to conserve marine resources, including non-target species, to 
ensure that fisheries remain productive for years to come.  
C. Expansion of the Public Trust to Other Fisheries 
 In each of the examples discussed above, NMFS either repealed an 
FMP or removed a species from an FMP in order to allow the State of 
Alaska to take a more direct management role in a fishery. Each NMFS 
decision was marked by agency assertions that the FMP amendment would 
result in conservation benefits to the affected species, implicitly 
                                                 
149. Salmon FMP, supra note 24, at 26.  
150. Id. 
151. See ALASKA CONST., art VIII §§ 3, 4.  
152. See Van Tuyn, supra note 31, at 666 (discussing “the unique decision-making structure of 
fishery management in the United States—where industry-dominated ‘regional fishery management 
councils’ are empowered to craft regulations for their own industry.”). 
153. Pacific Salmon, supra note 104, at 75575. 
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acknowledging the emphasis on sustainability that characterizes Alaska’s 
fishery management laws.154 Further, NMFS seems to recognize the 
importance of coordinating fishery management with the State of Alaska, 
a goal that is consistent with national standard 3,155 and which elevates the 
importance of Alaska’s fishery management policies by providing the 
state with more autonomy over EEZ fishery management. It seems likely 
that anytime a migratory species is at risk of being overfished, and the 
species is important to both the State of Alaska and the federal 
government, the NPFMC will work to accommodate any differences in 
fishery management policies by coordinating management with the state, 
as evidenced by the examples of Tanner crab, rockfish, and salmon in the 
EEZ off Alaska. The public trust doctrine will thus continue to be relevant 
with regard to migratory species of fish, even if the NPFMC does not adopt 
public trust principles in other FMPs. The State of Alaska’s management 
objectives reflect a public trust concern for future generations, and this 
concern will have to factor into any federal efforts to coordinate 
management with the state. Incorporating Alaska’s public trust doctrine 
into the management of migratory species also provides environmental 
plaintiffs with an important means of challenging fishery management 
decisions. If FMPs include public trust obligations, then a plaintiff can 
allege damage to the trust corpus whenever a fishing regulation 
jeopardizes the future of the fishery, even if that regulation might be 
reasonable under the MSA.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 The public trust doctrine is adrift in federal waters, waiting to be 
employed. It has already been incorporated into the management of EEZ 
fisheries in which the NPFMC has delegated or deferred management 
authority to the State of Alaska, because the state’s fishery management 
policy is always burdened by the public trust doctrine.156 There is no longer 
any doubt that the public trust doctrine is consistent with the MSA and 
federal management of the EEZ, as NMFS concluded that Alaska’s fishery 
management strategies, which reflect broad public trust concerns, are 
consistent with all applicable federal laws.157 Further, state management 
                                                 
154. See Salmon FMP, supra note 24; Rockfish FMP, supra note 114; Crab FMP, supra note 
113.  
155. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a)(3) (2012) (National standard 3 provides that “[t]o the extent 
practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed as a unit throughout its range, and interrelated 
stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination.”). 
156. See supra Part V.B. 
157. Id. 
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of certain EEZ fisheries subject to the state’s public trust principles is only 
possible in a regionalized fishery management system. Therefore, even in 
the absence of recognized federal public trust duties in the EEZ, deferring 
management of highly migratory stocks to the states provides a means of 
injecting the public trust doctrine into EEZ fishery management.158  
 However, the NPFMC and environmental plaintiffs should work to 
incorporate public trust principles into all federally managed fisheries for 
two reasons. First, in order to prevent inconsistent management of 
migratory stocks under NPFMC jurisdiction, as required by national 
standard 3,159 the public trust doctrine should apply to all fisheries in the 
EEZ that are important to both the federal government and the State of 
Alaska. Second, the MSA contains trust principles in its national 
standards,160 and fishery managers and environmental plaintiffs should be 
willing to invoke the public trust doctrine to encourage or defend 
management strategies that promote conservation of the entire marine 
ecosystem. If management efforts continue to focus on harvesting 
commercially valuable fish, the habitat essential to the survival of those 
fish, as well as living marine resources with less commercial value, will 
remain largely unregulated and thus unprotected.161 The destruction of 
these marine resources might deprive future generations of their 
usufructuary right of fishery, in violation of both the public trust doctrine 
and the MSA. The MSA requires that fishery management measures 
produce optimum yields “on a continuing basis,”162 reflecting a public 
trust concern for posterity, and sustained production requires a healthy 
ocean to support commercially viable fish populations.163 The public trust 
doctrine provides fishery managers with a means of correcting 
management oversights within the framework of existing regulations, and 
allows environmental plaintiffs to challenge commercial fishing activity 
that threatens the long-term health of fisheries in a manner inconsistent 
                                                 
158. See supra Part V.A. 
159. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(3) (2012).  
160. See supra Part IV.B.  
161. See 16 U.S.C. 1853(a)(7) (2011) (although the MSA supposedly requires FMPs to designate 
“essential fish habitat” and “minimize to the extent practicable adverse effects on such habitat caused 
by fishing,” this provision has not led to much actual habitat protection); See Van Tuyn, supra note 
29, at 670 (“In the North Pacific, NMFS focused almost exclusively on the designation and description 
of EFH, while deferring detailed consideration of the impacts of fishing on habitat—as well as 
measures to mitigate those impacts—until some undetermined second stage . . . ”). 
162. 16 U.S.C. 1851(a)(1) (2012).  
163. See Johnson, supra note 26 (“Regardless of where the right of fishery is recognized, it is 
meaningless unless fish are there to be caught. If the water is polluted, the fish die. Thus the right of 
fishery necessarily includes an implied right to water quality sufficient to support the fishery.”).  
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with the MSA’s national standards. All that is left is for the relevant actors 
in fishery management to seize and apply the doctrine.  
 
